The debates on the politics of Chinese engagement with African development have been infused with increasing concern over Chinese use of aid in exchange for preferential energy deals. Normative liberal discourse criticizes the Chinese for disbursing 'rogue aid' and undermining good governance in the African continent. These criticisms not only ignore the longer term motivations and modalities of Chinese aid and the historical diversity of Chinese relations with Africa, but also uncritically assumes 'Western' aid to be morally 'better' and 'more effective' in terms of development outcomes. There are three parts to this paper. First, it will discuss the emerging debates surrounding Chinese engagement in Africa, especially around aid and development issues. Second, the paper maps the historical development of China-Africa engagement and investigates the impacts of the changing modalities of Chinese aid in two case study countries: Angola and Ghana. We then conclude with a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between these two cases. Our principal argument is that different ideologies and practices of governance are used by both the Chinese and the western donors to conceal their own interests and political discourses in the African continent.
attended (FOCAC, 2006) , such a claim might look premature. Far from falling off the map, Africa has gained an importance and the Chinese are among a number of rapidly industrialising nations that see the continent in strategic economic terms. With this renewed economic interest have come diplomatic moves, which have raised a series of questions amongst others interested in Africa about the motives and sustainability of China's 'cooperation' with the continent (Marks, 2006; Bennett 2007 ).
Calderisi's book is one of a raft of publications dealing with Africa and/or the failure of aid (e.g. Easterly, 2007; Riddell, 2007; Collier, 2008; Easterly, 2008; Warah, 2008; Moyo 2009 ). Those dealing with aid in general (Easterly, 2008; Riddell, 2007) 
focus on
Western donors and those of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
The Chinese are not members of DAC and, as we will see, Chinese aid levels are still relatively low, but given the entwining of aid with other financial flows it is having a significant impact on the development fortunes of Africa. As such the focus on DAC donors underplays important drivers of African development. Where these recent books deal with China they issue a warning regarding authoritarianism in Africa since "the Chinese are making it worse, for they are none too sensitive when it comes to matters of governance" (Collier, 2008: 86) . This aid-governance nexus has become a key battleground in debating the efficacy of Chinese aid (Naim, 2007) . In an important intervention entitled Dead Aid the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo argued, amongst other things, that the emergence of China is a "golden opportunity" for Africa (Moyo, 2009: 120) offering the continent a 'win-win' alternative to the scenario of an 'aiddependent economy' by focusing instead on trade and investment and by providing the infrastructure that will enable Africa to "move up the development curve" (Moyo, 2009: 122) . While in general agreement with Moyo's argument that aid has not reduced poverty in Africa, we would argue that Moyo's prescriptions are problematic insofar as they are focused on neoliberal models of development and fail to recognise the negative consequences that such prescriptions have often had in Africa.
Despite these debates there are few tangible analyses 2 of Chinese 'aid' in action which examines its effects on recipients' development prospects. In undertaking a three year research project on China's engagement with African development we adopted a critical and comparative approach, exploring the diverse impacts of Chinese aid in Africa through two case study countries, Ghana and Angola, with a view to providing a more nuanced and disaggregated analysis. This article draws on field research conducted between November 2007 and May 2009 in China, the United States, London, Ghana and Angola involving in-depth semi-structured interviews with representatives from various government agencies, international bodies and civil society organisations. The case studies were selected for the different relationships they offered with China, largely around the different resource endowments they possessed and the types of state. And within them we focused on specific Chinese projects as examples of development 'assemblages' in Murray Li's (2007) sense. The paper aims to evaluate the changing motivations and modalities of Chinese aid in the two case studies and does so through an empirical analysis of what aid has accomplished in both cases. The paper is organised into three sections. The first section will briefly discuss the importance of Angola and Ghana as illustrative examples as well as the methods we have used in this research. The next section will examine the emerging debates and issues on Chinese aid in Africa. In particular, we will expound the logics, modalities and conditionalities of the Chinese model. The third section will detail histories of Chinese aid in Africa and the two case study countries in particular, focusing on its motivations and how past forms continue into the present. This sets up our analysis of recent aid and investment in Angola and
Ghana before a conclusion which examines the similarities and differences between the two cases and suggests policy responses to such emerging features of Sino-African development relations.
China's aid 'offensive' and the 'established' donors
Since researchers and policy watchers became aware of China's revived interests in Africa, there have been a number of contributions dealing with the levels, destinations and implications of Chinese aid (e.g. Lancaster, 2007; Huang, 2007; Davies et al, 2008; Kragelund, 2008; Stähle, 2007) . While useful these studies tend either to be pitched at the aid regime level in terms of geopolitics and donor relationships or they simply map the key flows without analysing the impacts on recipient countries. We use the debates around histories, modalities and conditionalities as a way of generating further research questions that we interrogate through the case studies of Angola and Ghana.
Histories and relationships
One of the recurrent themes about China as aid giver is that it is part of a wider group of 'emerging' donors (Manning, 2006; Woods, 2008 A further implication of the 'emerging donor' discourse is, as Kragelund (2008) observes, that China and many others deemed 'emerging' have been active donors for most of the Cold War period and beyond (see Snow, 1988; Brautigam, 1998) . What is more extraordinary is that through the 1980s and 1990s DAC members dominated aid-giving to an unprecedented degree (c. 95 per cent) (Manning, 2006) (2000) terms 'developmentalism' in the post-war period to a neoliberal 'globalism' in the 1980s and 1990s. The current trepidation about 'emerging' donors is, therefore, part of a wider concern about the rise of China and India as major global competitors that may signal a new orthodoxy in the political-economy of development (Schmitz, 2007; Henderson, 2008) .
That said the different approach of China as a donor has sharpened a set of existing criticisms from within the donor community. These revolve around the effectiveness of aid. Some time before China began to be criticised for its concessional financing the DAC donors were aware of the need for change. The Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s were seen as dogmatic and inflexible (Mohan et al, 2000) , aid conditionality created dependent 'governance states' (Harrison, 2004) , western aid had limited or even negative impacts on growth (Easterly, 2007) , and the mixture of bilateral and multilateral channels created a confusing operating field for recipient states (de Renzio, 2006) . So, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 3 was the culmination of these growing concerns with its emphasis on coordination and efficiency of aid. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate this initiative though some of the criticisms of the dominant aid paradigm are germane to our discussion. In brief the critique is that aid delivery is fragmented, comes through a confusing array of modalities, places too much pressure on recipient states, and increases transaction costs (see de Renzio, 2006; Collier, 2006; Birdsall, 2008) . The move towards Direct Budget Support, Poverty Reduction Strategies, and Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) are part of the response to these critiques and a move away from project-based approaches yet progress toward the budget support approach has been limited, fragmentation remains and donor coordination continues to be rather weak. The Chinese, as we will see, primarily deliver aid through discrete projects; the rationale being that projects avoid avenues for possible corruption (Interview with China Eximbank Bank Vice-President, 2008) and generally produce quick and tangible results. There are perhaps fewer differences then between China and the older, established donors than is often assumed in that established donors also continue to use a project approach. Interestingly one of the Round Tables at the 2008 Accra meeting to monitor implementation of the Paris Declaration was on 'Non-DAC' donors in recognition of the growing role they are playing or might play. Crucially, Chinese aid is seen by recipients as much more streamlined and speedy in reaching its 3 China is a signatory of the 2005 Paris declaration, evidently from a recipient perspective target. The argument in favour is that this makes it much more effective and efficient yet the downside is that this effectiveness is at the expense of governance, human rights and the environment. It is to these debates that we now turn.
Logics, modalities and conditionalities
In terms of the practices of aid delivery, much of China's rationale for its development cooperation has been to place it in a distinctive relation (often in opposition) to western aid logics and practices. However, China is following parallel paths in the way it articulates its vision of aid against those of older donors: on the one hand China stresses the distinctiveness of its approach, but on the other hand China is keen to assert that it contributes to or is part of global aid efforts, adopting the MDG language and seeking to be part of international organisations. Further, Chinese aid modalities are far from singular and static -Chinese approaches are diverse and Chinese aid practices in Africa are rapidly changing (Brautigam, 2009) According to more official accounts of China's approach to development cooperation China's strategy is "one of humanitarian and development aid plus influence without interference, in contrast to the West's coercive approach of sanctions plus military intervention" (Qian and Wu, 2007: 1) . By contrast "Chinese aid centres on the real needs of the recipient countries, free from the shackles of unpractical ideas" (Huang, 2007: 84) .
Like Japanese aid these 'real needs' are focused on infrastructure and agriculture without being "tied-up with a package of political or economic reforms" (Huang, 2007: 82 One of the problems of assessing Chinese aid is that historically a lack of domestic transparency compounds the uncertainties about what is and what is not considered 'aid' (Lancaster, 2007) . According to Brautigam (2009, 167-168) which is that it is official finance, seeking to promote economic development and welfare, and is concessional in character containing a grant element of at least 25 per cent (Riddell, 2007) . China does not use this definition which makes comparisons difficult (Glosny, 2006; Jacoby, 2007) . China therefore does not separate ODA from economic cooperation or investment as long as the intent is to expand the local capacity. China's lack of transparency on aid is slowly changing however. In 2008, Chinese premier Wen
Jiabao announced at a high-level meeting on the MDGs that China had disbursed US$30
billion in aid to all developing countries since 1950, about US$12 billion of which was in the form of grants. China's aid to Africa from 1956 to 2006 was also confirmed to be just under US$6 billion (Brautigam, 2010: 165) . Moreover China pursues a principle of "diversity in forms of interaction" through things like scholarships.
Estimates of contemporary Chinese 'aid' vary considerably and are often the subject of considerable miscalculation (Brautigam, 2009) It was usually given as a grant, or as an interest-free loan, which was different to the Soviet model where interest was charged at 2.5 per cent (Snow, 1988) . It was strictly bilateral in nature and only given where the relationship was mutually beneficial to donor and recipient alike. Chinese aid went to various sectors of African 'development' and many aid projects have had the word 'friendship' in them. All previous aid efforts were dwarfed however by the massive Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) which cost over US$600 million and was built with the help of 15,000 Chinese workers (Brautigam, 1998) . Finally, there was often a reluctance to coordinate efforts with other foreign powers and a deep-seated tendency to 'go it alone' sometimes resulting in active hostility to other aid personnel.
Today, much of the aid is bilateral, which necessitates a country-by-country analysis as provided in the following sections. Aid is also project based (often turn-key) rather than sectoral or programme aid (Glosny, 2006; Davies et al, 2008) and in concrete terms there is a blurring of the boundaries between aid and investment. The Chinese usually part pay for their oil and other resources in infrastructure which means there is less free-floating cash for unscrupulous diversion. The routes for aid and investment are the privileged Chinese corporations selected as part of the Chinese Government's 'Go Out' Policy of 2002 (Reilly and Na, 2007) , but as more companies internationalise it becomes harder for the Chinese state to maintain a coherent strategic and regulatory hold over them (Gill and Reilly, 2007) with Chinese corporations competing with one another (Downs, 2007) .
Decision-making around aid usually involves the recipient country approaching China, either through the embassy or at a higher diplomatic level. Indeed, it seems Chinese embassies are crucial nodes in these negotiations. At the Chinese side there is a range of ministries responsible for aid and overseas investment (Sautman and Hairong, 2006, Glosny, 2006; Brautigam, 2008) . The Department of Foreign Aid assembles the main foreign assistance budget and sends it up through the Ministry of Commerce to the Ministry of Finance, which collects the rest of the aid budgets from the other ministries (Brautigam, 2009 ). This budget includes the cost of the Departments, turn-key projects, military goods, grants in-kind, expenses for training programmes in China and technical assistance overseas, foreign aided joint ventures and cooperation projects along with the youth volunteer program (Brautigam, 2009) . If an agreement is reached between China and the recipient country a framework agreement is signed and the finance is assembled with MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce) playing the lead role in grants and China
Eximbank providing loans, although Brautigam (2008) shows how MOFCOM may pay the difference between a commercial loan rate and a concessional rate, thereby crosssubsidising China Eximbank. Once details have been negotiated a more detailed agreement is signed at which point MOFCOM assigns a Chinese company as contractor (Glosny, 2006: 19-20; AFRODAD, 2008: 12-13) . Hubbard (2008: 225) asserts that the Chinese insist that the Chinese contractor appointed by MOFCOM should "purchase and import from China as much equipment, technology and services as possible", which is similar to the earlier Japanese model. Labour importation is also part of this though research is needed into the actual levels as opposed to speculative hyperbole. A similar issue is raised around export credits which are the preferred currency used by China
Eximbank. Again the OECD instituted a 'gentleman's agreement' about the use of export credits, though this is limited to OECD members. Export credits are not classified as aid and potentially allow for more tying (Manning, 2006) , but Reisen and Ndoye's (2008) study suggests that despite China not being part of the DAC their lending is not 'imprudent' despite the accusations to the contrary.
One of the key criticisms of China's apparent insistence on non-interference and its blurring of concessional finance with other financial flows concerns conditionality. Why
China exorcises some commentators and activists is that it seemingly attaches no conditions to its loans and therefore undermines the good works of western donors around governance, human rights and environmental protection (Naim, 2007) . The ideological caveat of this critique of China by some western commentators is that despite people arguing that there is such a thing as 'pure' (Natsios, 2006) or 'altruistic' (Kragelund, 2008) This reinforces the projected image that China is now 'non-ideological' and pragmatic, since its concerns are commercial or altruistic rather than transforming hearts and minds.
A respondent in Beijing argued that the emphasis shifted in the early 1990s from 'southsouth solidarity' to one of 'mutual benefits', which by the turn of the millennium morphed into exhortations of 'win-win' scenarios (Interview with Liu Haifang, CASS, 2008). However, the backlash against China's role in Sudan, combined with an increasingly hazardous operating environment, has pushed China to weaken its 'noninterference' line and to become more involved in diplomacy (Large, 2008) . The question remains as to whether this weakening on non-interference is impacting on the ground in Africa in terms of China's engagement with domestic governance and capacity issues.
The competitive pressures the 'emerging' donors introduce gives recipient countries some leverage, what has been termed the 'revival of triangulation' (Large, 2008 The following sections will power the debates with concrete examples from Angola and Ghana.
Chinese aid in Angola and Ghana: forms, continuities and transformations
In this section we situate the current aid programme in the two case study countries in a longer history in order to demonstrate that Chinese aid has been tied to its geopolitical aspirations, that it is primarily bilateral, and that despite some familiar failings it has attempted to be less elitist in scope and execution. The second part of this section will then demonstrate in detail how aid has transformed, largely in the motivations and modalities, organised from various actors' perspectives in the context of Angola and Ghana.
The historical and geopolitical dimensions of Chinese cooperation with Africa
While China's recent involvements in Africa grabbed headlines, this is not the first time that China has sought to engage politically and developmentally with the African continent. According to Lyman (2005) , the early days of PRC diplomacy primarily involved attempts to counter the international recognition of Taiwan and to compete with billion Chinese official foreign aid was extended to Africa (Yu, 1980) . This waned in the mid-1970s, but picked up again in the mid-1980s where between 1983 and 1995 China's aid contribution to Africa stood at an average of US$200 million per year (Snow, 1995: 311).
In Ghana, at a farewell banquet on 15 January 1964, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai confirmed Beijing's support for African struggles against imperialism (which he called 'the poor helping the poor') setting the stage for Africa as an ideological battleground with both Washington and Moscow (Ismael, 1971) . For Taylor (2006) , the link connecting all Chinese foreign policy over the past 50 years is a desire to diminish and contain the influence of hegemonic powers and also to carve out a rightful place for China in the world, born from a sense that China has been 'muscled out' of international relations. In the 1960s China provided development assistance to Ghana mainly in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. However, the amount was relatively small, totalling US$43 million for that decade (MOFCOM, 2008) .
This ideological rivalry was further manifested in the context of Angola. Zhou's announcement about support for anti-imperial movements during his 1963-4 tour pointed to the PRC's desire to lead the developing world and confirmed the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship. During the anti-colonial war in Angola, Peking claimed that while it tried to promote unity among the Angolan movements, Moscow was deliberately instigating the civil war in an attempt to gain influence in that resource rich country (Guimaraes, 1998) . In Peking's view, Moscow attempted to 'fish in troubled waters' (Coker, 1985: 63) . Unlike the Soviet Union, the Chinese emphasized the struggle between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds, between the North and the South.
In this context, China placed itself squarely as the champion of the Third World (Guimarães, 1998: 154) . Towards the end of the anti-colonial war in Angola however China threw its weight behind the FNLA rather than the MPLA movement that went on to form the party-state that has dominated Angola since independence in 1975.
Within years of the completion of the flagship TAZARA project, major shifts were underway within China's domestic and foreign policy which saw a gradual dilution of the ideological focus in policy-making in favour of a greater emphasis on economic cooperation (Muekalia, 2004) . Between 1976 and 1982 total Chinese aid pledges to Africa fell from US$100.9 million to just US$13.8 million (Snow, 1995: 306) . In the mid-1980s
China's Africa policy shifted from support for Maoist-inspired revolution to the search for new commercial engagements that would strengthen the PRC's economy. Deng adopted a policy of non-interference, encouraging African countries to find political and economic models of development to suit their own particular circumstances (Wang, War ideology replaced by the 'pragmatism' of economic growth. It is here that we need to be careful about claims that China is no longer ideological in its aid. It is not, as we argue later, that ideology is not important, but that the ideology has changed even if the polemic remains constant.
After June 1989, China underwent a major re-evaluation of its foreign policies as it ended its 'honeymoon' relationship with the West. Given their numerical weight in international organisations, African states played an essential role in the Chinese stratagem (Tull, 2006: 460-461 Africa thus played an important role for China in its struggle to be free of the overt influence of any one power and in regaining its eminence in the international system (Taylor, 1998) . China substantially stepped up its aid in the late 1990s on the back of China's massive domestic growth and demand for resources. This market-driven development created a huge demand for resources (Frederick, 2004) and Africa presented a viable and untapped supply of resources and market for its cheap exports. As a result, Chinese engagement with Africa has gathered pace. The following section will now analyse the different forms of Chinese aid and its outcomes at the local level in Angola and Ghana.
Contemporary development relations in Angola and Ghana
In the previous section, it was argued that China's recent interests in Africa are built on longer histories of cooperation which have tended to be couched in terms of solidarity and development rather than aid. Current 'aid' is tied into geopolitical agendas, economic cooperation as well as to specific resource acquisitions. In many senses, given that all aid is politically and economically motivated, the Chinese are not behaving much differently from previous industrial powers intent on accessing African resources. Some authors (Carroll, 2006; Marks, 2006) are sceptical about China's interest in Africa as a form of 'south-south cooperation' 4 , suggesting it might be the more familiar and hegemonic 'north-south relationship'. But where they do appear different from western powers is the types of political relationships they operate through, as well as envisage for, Africa. It is to these that we now turn. Xu Ning, Industrial and Commercial Association Angola-China). Where Angolans have been able to find work on Chinese construction sites it has often been as security guards rather than on equal terms as waged labourers.
In spite of the growing magnitude of China's projects in Angola very little is known about them. As a result there have been many myths about the terms of co-operation. In many ways this is because both governments have largely conducted their bilateral cooperation in the form of a "narrow elite business dialogue" (Vines and Campos, 2008: 15) . Assessing the impact of China's 'foreign assistance' projects in Angola is further complicated by the 'bundling' of this 'assistance' with direct foreign investments from the approved Chinese companies. Thus oil-backed loans and credits are intertwined with massive investments by state-led enterprises such as the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and the privately-owned CIF. This is not 'aid' in any conventional sense therefore. In many cases it is unclear how money has been spent in the projects that have resulted from bilateral co-operation as the funds are often tracked so far off the books that they do not appear in any budgets whilst the bidding process for the lucrative contracts themselves has also often been rather opaque.
Indeed opacity is one of the defining characteristics of China-Angola co-operation so far.
There is a great deal of opacity around the CIF and its relations to the GRN for example This presence and intensity of Chinese involvement is less evident in Ghana, largely due to the lack of strategic minerals although this will change due the discovery of offshore Like Angola's recent return to the IMF it appears that the GoG has turned to the Chinese aid/investment packages when other avenues for commercial financing have been closed.
As one aid official noted: …a package of tied lending is only interesting when there is more limited access to the international market and I think that is why many African countries find this package interesting, because they don't have access to the markets.
The coming years are likely to see market access to finance even more limited and so
China's leveraged option may well be much more appealing.
In terms of donor harmonisation invitations to become more involved in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy were rejected by the Chinese, although they often attended meetings as observers. One interpretation is that as noted at the start the Chinese do not see themselves as donors. A western aid official spoke rhetorically from a Chinese perspective:
…we are not a donor, we are a poor country so we can't really afford to give grants, on the other hand we want to trade and that would benefit everyone.
At the same time, the Chinese officials were often frustrated during meetings with DAC officials, who they argued often start the conversation with 'let us set up some standards first and how much money could you contribute?!' For the Chinese, there is still much apprehension about these standards and reaching them. They are more concerned with the concrete outcome of aid projects, hence mostly involving in infrastructural projects. Most important, there are no benefits to the Chinese for abiding by the OECD norms, except to increase approval ratings from DAC counterparts.
Conclusion
The wider debate on aid effectiveness and conditionalities is no doubt the product of confrontations between global players seeking to delegitimise the other and in so doing to justify one's own approach. We saw how the Chinese used aid in the Cold War to 'show up' the indulgent 'West' but also how this is today an ambivalent strategy -China both stresses the distinctiveness of its approach yet also asserts its desire to contribute to or be part of global aid efforts. Now the more extreme criticisms of Chinese aid projects in (Wilson, 2005) , but rather than outright criticism they prefer a 'dialogic' approach (see Tjonneland et al 2006) .
However, Beijing has no economic incentive to fall in line with Western views on issues such as fiscal transparency and accountability. 'By rejecting regulation efforts on the grounds of non-interference, China can position itself to win the political favour of, and 5 In 1999, the IMF announced its shift, symbolized by renaming its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The World Bank then introduced PRSPs, initially as the basis on which poor countries would receive debt relief under HIPC. Subsequently, the PRSP approach was extended to other low-income countries, and was turned into a condition to receive financial support from the Washington-based institutions.
by extension economic benefits from, sovereignty-conscious governments (e.g. Angola)' (Tull, 2006: 474) . Some critics thus challenge that international donors engage with governance in ways to fit their own specific mandates.
As discussed above, Chinese modalities of aid in both Angola and Ghana are different in nature and definition from the OECD countries. Mainly tailored to the political and socioeconomic conditions of the two countries, what we saw was more concessional loans in brick and mortar projects in Angola and Ghana which are 'economically' tied through the terms of the contracts. Also, Angola is a net oil exporter while Ghana a net importer.
Following the recent discovery of oil, Ghana could perhaps learn from and begin to resist the temptation of pursuing the Angolan model of collateralising its oil. There are some important similarities between the nature of China's activities in both case study countries, which have been heavily concentrated around resources and construction.
Much of the major development is enclavic, centred on importing capital equipment, raw materials and labour. That said the nature of Chinese labour practices in both countries is often overblown and some of the assumptions made about this really only apply to the big Chinese SOEs -many Chinese SMEs do employ Africans and as Alden (2008) notes they are likely to have a major impact on African economic development for the coming years. There are also some important differences in the way that both countries have reacted to China's growing presence. They are the state capacity and the willingness to enforce laws -Angola has established 'parallel' forms of governance to manage the reconstruction projects involving China through opaque agencies like the GRN whereas Ghana enforces labour, immigration and investment laws and may limit absolute investment as a result. In both cases the nature of aid, trade and investment linkages between the two countries remains the product of an elite level business dialogue and 'ordinary' Africans don't have much say in the nature of this partnership and its outcomes
